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This appeal presents the question whether under 18 
U.S.C. S3553(a)(4), as amended in 1994, a district court, in 
imposing a term of imprisonment upon revocation of 
supervised release, is required (in the absence of grounds 
for departure) to impose a term within the range indicated 
by U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 (Policy Statement). Prior to the 1994 
amendment, we held that the sentencing ranges set out in 
U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 were merely advisory. United States v. 
Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 892-93 (3d Cir. 1991). Since the 
1994 amendment, all but one of the courts of appeals that 
have addressed this question have reached the same 
conclusion. In accordance with these decisions, we now 
hold that, despite the 1994 amendment, the ranges set out 
in U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 remain advisory and not binding. 
 
Joseph Schwegel pled guilty and was convicted in 1993 
for several drug-related offenses, and he was sentenced to 
40 months of imprisonment followed by 60 months of 
supervised release. After serving 31 months of 
imprisonment, he was placed on supervised release, and it 
is uncontested that he committed several violations of the 
conditions of his release, including testing positive for 
drugs. 
 




Under U.S.S.G. S7B1.4, Schwegel's range of 
imprisonment was six to twelve months, but the prosecutor 
argued that this range was merely advisory and 
recommended that the court impose a sentence of 60 
months. (App. 37a-38a). Schwegel's attorney agreed that 
the ranges set out in U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 were not binding, but 
he urged the court to "consider a sentence more in line with 
the guidelines," specifically, a sentence of"six months 
incarceration, three months in an inpatient program, 
something of that sort." (App. 33a-34a). The district court 
judge stated that he did not think that six months would be 
"enough to wean" Schwegel of his drug addiction, and the 
judge therefore sentenced him to three years of 
imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release. 
 
On appeal, Schwegel argues that, contrary to the position 
taken before the district court, the sentencing range set out 
in U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 was mandatory and that the district 
court committed plain error in imposing a sentence outside 
that range. Schwegel contends that the plain meaning of 
18 U.S.C. SS3553(a)(4)(B) and 3553(b) (1994) dictates 
acceptance of his argument. Section 3553(b) provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
 
        (b) Application of guidelines in imposing a 
       sentence. The court shall impose a sentence of the 
       kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection 
       (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an 
       aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to 
       a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 
       the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
       guidelines that should result in a sentence different 
       from that described. 
 
18 U.S.C. S3553(b). According to Schwegel, this provision 
requires a sentencing court (unless there is a basis for 
departure) to comply with any sentencing range "referred 
to" in 18 U.S.C. S3553(a)(4). And, Schwegel maintains, the 
ranges set out in U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 are "referred to" in 18 
U.S.C. S3553(a)(4)(B), which was added in a 1994 
amendment. Under this provision, a sentencing court is 
required to "consider," among other things 
 
        (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 
       established for- . . . 
 




         (B) in the case of a violation of probation or 
       supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy 
       statements issued by the Sentencing Commission 
       pursuant to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States 
       Code. 
 
18 U.S.C. S3553(a)(4)(B). Since U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 is a policy 
statement that was issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S994(a)(3) 
and that sets out sentencing ranges for violation of 
supervised release, Schwegel argues, 18 U.S.C. 
S3553(a)(4)(B) refers to the sentencing ranges set out in 
U.S.S.G. S7B1.4, and those ranges, by virtue of 18 U.S.C. 
S3553(b), are binding. 
 
We do not agree with Schwegel that the plain meaning of 
18 U.S.C. S3553 requires us to accept his argument. 
Although Schwegel maintains, as previously noted, that 18 
U.S.C. S3553(b) dictates that a sentencing court comply 
with any sentencing range "referred to in subsection(a)(4)," 
it is reasonable to read this provision more narrowly to 
mandate compliance with only those sentencing ranges set 
out in "guidelines," rather than advisory policy statements. 
Under 18 U.S.C. S3553(b), a sentencing court must impose 
a sentence "within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) 
unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines . .. ." 18 U.S.C. 
S3553(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is reasonable to 
read the term "range" in 18 U.S.C. S3553(b) to mean a 
range set out in a guideline. Moreover, the heading of 18 
U.S.C. S 3553(b), "Application of guidelines in imposing a 
sentence," also tends to support the view that this provision 
applies to ranges set out in guidelines as opposed to policy 
statements. 
 
Schwegel contends that the term "guidelines" in 18 
U.S.C. S3553(b) means "the entire system of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, including policy statements." 
Appellant's Br. at 13. But while it is not inconceivable that 
Congress might have used the term "guidelines" in this 
sense, that is certainly not the term's plain meaning. Thus, 
in making this argument, Schwegel implicitly recognizes the 
 




necessity of looking beyond the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
S3553's text. 
 
In United States v. Cohen, 99 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1996), the 
court seems to have held that the plain meaning of 18 
U.S.C. S3553(b), far from supporting Schwegel's position, 
actually refutes it. Cohen appears to have held that the 
plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. S3553(b) is that only those 
sentencing ranges contained in guidelines are binding. Id. 
at 71. While we are reluctant to go that far, we are 
convinced that the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. S3553 does 
not require us to adopt Schwegel's position. 
 
Looking beyond the bare statutory language, we conclude 
that the sentencing ranges set out in U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 
remain merely advisory. Under 28 U.S.C. S994(a)(3), the 
Sentencing Commission is required to issue guidelines or 
policy statements concerning revocation of supervised 
release. To comply with this requirement, the Commission 
promulgated Chapter Seven of the Guidelines Manual in 
1990. As we explained in Blackston, 940 F.2d at 893: 
 
        Realizing that events were proceeding rapidly, and 
       that, lacking experience in the area, it needed 
       additional time to consider the complex issues relating 
       to revocation of probation and supervised release, the 
       Sentencing Commission opted for advisory policy 
       statements in order to maximize flexibility. See id. 
       ("[T]he Commission anticipates that, because of its 
       greater flexibility, the policy statement option will 
       provide better opportunities for evaluation by the 
       courts and the Commission."). In issuing only advisory 
       policy statements, the Sentencing Commission sought 
       to set in motion an "evolutionary process," of which the 
       policy statements were only the first step. See id. Ch. 
       7, Part A5. After monitoring and evaluating feedback 
       from judges, probation officers, and practitioners, the 
       Sentencing Commission expected to promulgate formal 
       revocation guidelines. See id. 
 
To date, the Commission has still not issued guidelines 
concerning the revocation of supervised release. Nor has 
the Commission altered its view that the Chapter Seven 
policy statements are merely advisory. 
 




Although Schwegel argues that the 1994 amendment that 
added 18 U.S.C. S3553(a)(4)(B) made the sentencing ranges 
in U.S.S.G. S7B1.4 mandatory, it is apparent that this was 
not Congress's intent. The 1994 amendment was proposed 
by the Sentencing Commission, see 136 Cong. Rec. 
S14894-95 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1990), which continues to 
view those ranges as merely providing guidance and as the 
first step in an evolutionary process. We do not think that 
Congress, in adopting an amendment recommended by the 
Commission, meant to overrule the Commission's view that 
it was premature to require rigid adherence to the U.S.S.G. 
S7B1.4 ranges. 
 
The legislative history shows that the 1994 amendment, 
which was initially proposed by the Commission in 1990, 
had a different purpose. As the then-Chairman of the 
Commission, Fourth Circuit Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., 
explained in a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, the 
purpose of the amendment was to make it clear that 
resentencing for probation and supervised release violations 
should be based "upon sentencing guidelines and policy 
statements issued by the Commission specifically for that 
purpose," rather than upon the guidelines applicable to the 
initial sentencing. See 136 Cong. Rec. S14894-95. This was 
necessitated by United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133 (11th 
Cir. 1990), in which the Eleventh Circuit had held that the 
guideline range applicable to the initial sentencing decision 
also constrains the court when it revokes probation. Judge 
Wilkins explained: 
 
       [T]o the extent this view of the law is sustained, it will 
       impede Commission plans to implement a system of 
       policy statements for revocation decisions, preparatory 
       to issuing guidelines for revocation at a future date. 
       Toward this end, the Commission has just approved a 
       set of policy statements to guide courts in making 
       decisions regarding the revocation of probation and 
       supervised release and plans to distribute th[e]m in the 
       next several weeks. The Eleventh Circuit decision in 
       Smith would appear, however, effectively to block 
       courts in that circuit from using these policy 
       statements for probation revocation decisions. 
 




        The attached proposed legislative change modifies 
       the statutory language upon which the Eleventh 
       Circuit rested its decision to promote an interpretation 
       that is consistent with Congressional intent under the 
       Sentencing Reform Act. It specifically references the 
       guidelines or policy statements issued by the 
       Commission under [2]8 U.S.C. S994(a)(3) to remove any 
       doubt that these pronouncements -- not those 
       applicable to initial sentencing decisions -- are the 
       appropriate reference for revocation purposes. 
 
136 Cong. Rec. S14895. 
 
The bill proposed by the Sentencing Commission was not 
enacted in 1990 and was reintroduced by Senator 
Thurmond in 1991 and 1993. Senator Thurmond stated 
that the legislation had been "suggested to me by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission" and explained its purpose as 
follows: 
 
       [T]his bill provides that decisions to revoke supervised 
       release should be based upon sentencing guidelines 
       and policy statements issued by the Commission 
       specifically for that purpose. The effect of this change 
       would be to settle a split among the Federal courts on 
       the issue of whether the guidelines applicable to initial 
       sentencing of defendants also apply to probation 
       revocation decisions. 
 
137 Cong. Rec. S7769-70 (daily ed. June 13, 1991). 
Senator Thurmond added that the bill would require that, 
in choosing an appropriate sentence for a violation of 
probation, "the court's discretion would be guided by any 
guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission expressly to govern probation revocation" 
rather than by the guideline range for the defendant's 
original sentencing. 139 Cong. Rec. S2150 (daily ed. Feb. 
25, 1993). It therefore seems clear that Congress did not 
enact 18 U.S.C. S3553(a)(4)(B) for the purpose of making 
the sentencing ranges set out in Chapter Seven policy 
statements mandatory. 
 
Schwegel cites one passage in the legislative history as 
supporting his position. Referring to a predecessor of the 
bill that was ultimately enacted, Senator Thurmond said 
 




that it was intended to "make more explicit the intent of 
Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act that, when revoking 
a probationary sentence, the guideline range operative at 
the time the defendant was sentenced to probation is no 
longer applicable; rather the court is constrained only by 
the maximum statutory penalties for the offense and any 
Sentencing Commission guidelines or policy statements 
specifically applicable to probation revocation." 137 Cong. 
Rec. S7770 (1991) (statement of Senator Thurmond) 
(emphasis added). However, this statement does not 
persuade us that Congress meant to require the imposition 
of a sentence within the ranges set out in U.S.S.G. S7B1.4. 
There is no question that under 18 U.S.C. S3553(a)(4), a 
sentencing court must "consider" the range set out in 
U.S.S.G. S7B1.4; and therefore, to that extent, the 
sentencing court is, as Senator Thurmond stated, 
"constrained" by U.S.S.G. S7B1.4. We are not persuaded 
that Senator Thurmond's statement was intended to 
suggest anything more. 
 
The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have issued published decisions rejecting 
the argument that Schwegel now advances. See United 
States v. Hale, 107 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Cohen, 99 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 
1699 (1997); United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482 (10th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357 (11th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied sub nom. Andrews v. United States, 117 
S.Ct. 717 (1997); United States v. Escamilla, 70 F.3d 835 
(5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1368 (1996); United 
States v. Carr, 66 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
West, 59 F.3d 32 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 486 
(1995). We agree with these decisions. To the extent that 
United States v. Plunkett, 94 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1996) 
reaches a different conclusion, we respectfully disagree. We 
therefore hold that the district court was not required to 
sentence Schwegel to a sentence within the range set out in 
U.S.S.G. S7B1.4. 
 
Schwegel argues that, even if this is so, the district court 
nevertheless abused it discretion by failing to give adequate 
consideration to the policy statement range. We do not 
agree. The court noted that the policy statement called for 
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a sentence of six to twelve months, but the court decided 
that a longer sentence was necessary in order to give 
Schwegel sufficient time in custody to recover from his drug 
addiction. See App. at 42a. We review the district court's 
decision to exceed the policy statement range under an 
abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Hofierka, 83 F.3d at 
361-62. We conclude that the district court properly 
considered the policy statement sentencing range and 
properly exercised its discretion. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district 
court. 
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